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1. Introduction
Most people take it for granted that terrorism is the major plague we are now dealing with in
the 21st century. On a number of occasions, terrorists succeeded in inflicting massive civilian
casualties and colossal damage, as in the case of the attacks on the World Trade Towers in
New York on September 11, 2001, the bombings aboard four commuter trains in Madrid on
March 11, 2004, and the bombings on the London subway on July 7, 2005. Although, in
connection with the proliferation of religious terrorism, the propensity for spectacular large-
scale attacks increased, terrorism is not restricted to Islamic militants in general and al Queda
in particular. Rather, many countries were plagued by terrorist campaigns in the 20th century.
Fighters in anti-colonial struggles, ethnic separatist groups, revolutionary left-wing terrorists
and their right-wing counterparts all tried to harm their opponents in order to force them to
yield to their demands or overthrow them (see e.g. Hoffman, 1998; Wilkinson, 2000).
This paper focuses on the economic costs and overall consequences for society of terrorism.
Terrorism can affect economic activity in four different ways. First, terrorist attacks derogate
a country’s capital stock, both human and physical capital. Examples of such direct
destructions are the impacts of September 11, 2001, or the frequent attacks on oil pipelines.
Second, terrorist campaigns divert foreign resources away from the affected countries to other
destinations. Primary examples are the tourism industry and foreign direct investment. Third,
terrorism induces higher level of uncertainty and, thereby, distorts the resource allocation
within a country through changes in the individuals’ savings, investment and consumption
behaviour. Fourth, heightened security measures increase transaction costs and draw away
resources from more productive use. Moreover, terrorist attacks evoke a climate of fear which
reduces people’s well-being beyond the immediate economic consequences.1
The central aim is to show that the various damages done by terrorism can be empirically
measured.2 In recent years, economic scholars have analyzed the effects terrorist acts have on
                                                 
1 Terrorism can have serious effects on other aspects of society, such as on politics. Thus, the terrorist
attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 resulted in a sudden and substantial drop in the votes going to the
reigning Partido Popular, so that it lost the election which it had looked virtually certain to win
before. This loss has been largely attributed to the incompetent reaction on the part of the government
to the attack (Financial Times 2004, p. 11). Studying the relationship between terrorist attacks in Israel
and the occupied territories from 1990 and 2003 and electoral outcomes in Israel, Berrebi and Klor
(2004) find that relative support for the rightist party increases after periods with high levels of
terrorism and decreases after relatively calm periods.
2 No general survey on the economic research on terrorism is provided in this paper; this has been
done elsewhere. See e.g. Enders and Sandler (1995), Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Sandler and
Enders (2004).
- 3 -
different aspects of the economy and society. We briefly discuss how the extent of terrorism
is measured and the most important trends in international terrorism (section 2). The
following section assesses empirical studies on the impact of terrorism on tourism, foreign
direct investment, savings and consumption, investments, stock markets, foreign trade,
urbanization and overall economic development, including the costs of the attacks of
September 11, 2001.3 Several estimates of the effects of terrorism will be given, but it is, of
course, not possible to come up with one single figure for the economic damages caused by
terrorism. Moreover, the overall effects of terrorism may well exceed the economic
consequences. Therefore, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses of the
population affected, as well as first results, are discussed in section 4. Section 5 offers
concluding remarks.
2. Counting terrorist acts and casualties
Most studies assessing the tragedy of terrorism rely on indicators of terrorist activity.4 Some
of the social science literature uses these measures directly to evaluate the harm suffered.
Instead, in the research surveyed below, measures of terrorist activity are used as an input to
calculate the various costs of terrorism to the economy. This section, therefore, briefly
discusses how terrorist activity is captured in international statistics.
A frequently used indicator is the number of terrorist incidents. However, counting the
number of terrorist incidents means that terrorist activities of widely varying magnitude are
lumped together. The attacks on the World Trade Center would be counted as one (or perhaps
two) event(s), the same as taking one person as a hostage. Such measurements can capture
developments in terrorism only if the structure of terrorist events remains more or less
unchanged. Thus, measuring the number of incidents makes sense if the percentage of hostage
takings and major attacks remains approximately constant. The varying intensity of terrorist
                                                 
3 Related issues not discussed in this paper are the effects of terrorism on fiscal policy (see e.g. Gupta
et al., 2004; Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2005) and the discussion about the insurability of terrorism risks
(see e.g. Cummins and Lewis, 2003; Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Porter, 2003; Brown, 2004).
Precursors interested in the general interaction between war, peace and economic conditions are Pigou
(1916; 1921), Keynes (1919) and Robbins (1940). More recent contributions, analyzing the interaction
of conflict and economic activity, are Hess and Orphanides (1995; 2001), Garfinkel (1990; 1994),
Grossman (1991) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
4 Exceptions are Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), who use a truce unilaterally declared by the ETA in
the late 1990s as a natural experiment, and the studies focusing on the consequences of specific
incidents, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks discussed in section 3.
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attacks is often captured by the number of casualties. Some data only use the number of
persons killed, while other data also take into consideration the number of people injured.
Another problem is that only those terrorist events reflected in official statistics and reported
in the media are counted. Reliance on official statistics is often mistaken, because either the
authorities themselves do not know or deliberately bias their reporting. The media only pick
up on some terrorist events, mostly those occurring in the larger cities or the capital of the
country, where the foreign journalists normally reside. Terrorist action taking place in remote
rural areas is rarely, if ever, reported in the media. The problem of biased reporting is
especially severe in less developed and authoritarian countries (see e.g. Miller, 1994).
The problems associated with the limits of comparing different types of attacks and of biased
reporting of attacks have been addressed in various ways in the literature. First, the analysis is
usually confined to developed countries where the reporting bias is less of a problem. Second,
the consequences are often estimated for a small number of countries, or even a single
country, where modes of attack are comparable across countries and over time (exceptions are
the combined cross-country and time-series analyses of Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides,
2004; Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004 discussed below). Third, some authors explicitly
differentiate between attacks of different types and at different locations (see e.g. Drakos and
Kutan, 2003; Fielding, 2003b).
In the case of international terrorism, where foreign interests are involved, the reporting bias
is likely to be less severe. Employing the official US definition of terrorism (22 USC §
2656f[d]), the US Department of State issues series covering the annual number of incidents
of international terrorism and the number of fatalities. International terrorism is defined as
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. These series are
depicted in figure 1.
The number of terrorist events recorded in this statistic varies considerably from 125 in 1968
to 665 in 1987.5 Since reaching a peak in the late 1980s, the number of incidents has been on
the decline. This finding contrasts with the general notion that terrorism has become an ever-
increasing threat. The number of people killed in terrorist incidents also varies considerably,
from 34 in 1968 to 3,250 in 2001. No clear trend is visible and the series is greatly influenced
                                                 
5 It is, however, important to keep in mind that international terrorist acts are only a small fraction of
all terrorist attacks taking place. In the years 1998 to 2002, the number of recorded domestic terrorist
incidents was around 11 times higher than the number of international terrorist incidents; the
respective number for fatalities is around 4 times higher (see the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Databases;
www.mipt.org).
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by spectacular events, such as the simultaneous bombing of the American embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998 and the attacks of September 11, 2001. As these series exhibit, the level
of international terrorist acts is on the decline, while the number of fatalities has not been
reduced as much. This implies that terrorism has become increasingly lethal – a common
observation made by scholars studying terrorism. According to Enders and Sandler (2002), an
incident in recent years is about 17 percentage points more likely to result in casualties than in
the 1970s. This increase in lethality has been attributed to the increasing proportion of
fundamentalist terrorist groups seeking mass casualties of innocent people to make their cause
more widely known. In contrast, the leftist-based terrorists and nationalist terrorists want to
instigate a revolution and aim at winning the hearts of the people. They therefore avoid killing
or maiming innocent people not directly connected with the existing political and economic
regime.
Further, using spectral analysis on a quarterly index of various terrorist activities (ITERATE,
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events; see Mickolus 1982 and Mickolus et
al. 1989; 1993), a number of cycles have been identified (Enders and Sandler, 2002).
Logistically complicated incidents, such as large-scale suicide car bombings, the hijacking of
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Figure 1. International terrorism, 1968-2003, number of incidents and number of fatalities
Source: US Department of State (various years) and Sandler and Enders (2004).
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planes and assassinations have longer cycles than less sophisticated events. Terrorist activity
developing in cycles, rather than as a continuous movement in one direction, has been
attributed to various causes: demonstration and imitation effects act as propagators;
economies of scale in planning terrorist incidents lower the cost for a restricted period of
time; after a terrorist act there is a public outcry, inducing the authorities to take drastic
measures which, again for a restricted period of time, reduce international terrorist activity.
This “attack-counterattack cycle” results in fluctuations.
3. Terrorism’s impact on various aspects of the economy
Over the last few years, scholars have analyzed the effects terrorist acts have on various
aspects of the economy. In the following, the results for tourism, foreign direct investment,
savings and consumption, investment, stock markets, foreign trade, the urban economy
(including the costs of the attacks of September 11, 2002), and overall economic development
are surveyed.
1. Tourism. Tourists have become a frequent target of terrorist activities in recent years,6
generating huge resonance in the media. Examples are the Luxor massacre in 1997, in which
members of an Egyptian Islamic group shot dead 58 foreign tourists visiting the temple of
Queen Hatshepsut in the Valley of the Queens, and the bombing of a disco in Bali in 2002,
costing the lives of almost 200 tourists. There is a simple rationale for these attacks.
Individuals planning their holidays are less likely to choose a destination with a higher threat
of terrorist attacks. Host countries providing tourism services, which can be easily substituted,
are, therefore, negatively affected by terrorist attacks to a substantial extent. The expected
reactions from consumers make the bombing, shooting and kidnapping of tourists attractive
strategies for terrorists who want to inflict economic damage, when pursuing their political
goals. There is a fast growing literature evaluating the effects of terrorism on tourism,
focusing on the number of tourists and lost revenues in the industry. Special attention is given
to substitution issues and the temporal structure of the effects.
In an early, influential paper, Enders and Sandler (1991) study the relationship between
international terrorism and tourism in Spain. They use monthly data on terrorist incidents and
combine it with the number of foreign visitors in Spain between 1970 and 1988, applying
VAR methodology. It is estimated that a typical terrorist act in Spain scares away over
                                                 
6 It is argued that tighter security measures for military and government facilities made tourists
relatively more attractive for terrorist attacks (see e.g. Im, Cauley and Sandler, 1987).
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140,000 tourists, when all the monthly impacts are combined. In 1988, 5.392 million
foreigners visited Spain and 18 international terrorist incidents took place. Hence without
these incidents, 1.5 times as many tourists would have visited Spain in 1988.
Careful econometric analyses reveal similar repercussions from terrorism on other tourist
destinations. In a time-series analysis based on quarterly terrorism data and the ARIMA
technique, Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992) quantify the present value of loss in tourism
revenues for a sample of European countries. According to their calculations, Austria, Italy
and Greece lost $4.538 billion, $1.159 billion and $0.77 billion respectively between 1974
and 1988 (in 1988 terms, using a real interest rate of 5%). For comparative purposes, total
revenues in these countries in 1988 amounted to $11.149 billion, $19.311 billion and $3.29
billion respectively. For the same period, continental Europe as a whole lost $16.145 billion
due to terrorism (total tourist revenues in 1988 were $74.401 billion). Fleischer and Buccola
(2002) estimate a supply and demand model of the Israeli hotel industry to assess the impact
of terrorism. Foreign demand and equilibrium prices are allowed to be influenced by a
monthly index, capturing the severity of the terrorist campaign in Israel. The annual revenue
shortfalls between 1992 and 1998 in the market with foreign visitors sum up to approximately
$50 million (1998 present value discounted at 5%) or 1.27% of total revenues in this period.
Though these revenue losses are relatively modest, they increase with a deterioration of the
situation. In 1996, a year of Middle East unrest, the revenue shortfall amounted to 2.55%.
Further, it is claimed that, due to inelastic local demand, hotels could not easily compensate
these losses by cutting prices.
Two recent studies look at the effect of an intensification of extraordinary terrorist events on
US tourist receipts and US airline demand. Sloboda (2003) uses ARMAX methodology to
analyze annual time series of the number of terror attacks on US interests and US tourism
receipts for the period 1988 to 2001, and estimates the effect of the Gulf War in 1991 and the
accompanying increase in anti-American attacks on tourism revenues. In 1991, the number of
incidents on US interests roughly doubled; this shock had a temporary negative impact on the
tourism industry, which lasted until 2000. Aggregating the annual impacts of this initial shock
(i.e. the impact of the increase in terrorism in later years is not included), total losses in
revenue are approximately $57 billion (1996 present value discounted at 5%). Ito and Lee
(2005) assess the impact of the September 11 attacks and the imposition of stringent new
security requirements on domestic airline demand in the USA. The authors estimate a reduced
form model of demand for air services with monthly time-series data since 1986 and model
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the post-September 11 period as an attenuating shock process that has both a transitory and an
ongoing component. After controlling for cyclical, seasonal and other unique events
impacting the industry, the initial demand shock is estimated to be more than 30% measured
in revenue passenger miles (RPMs), and 7.3% measured in yields. The decline in yield is
smaller because a large number of airline tickets are purchased well in advance. In addition to
the transitory shock, there is an ongoing downward shift in the demand of 7.4% measured in
RPMs and of 10% measured in yields. The decline in demand is especially pronounced in the
short-haul market, where more substitution possibilities are available. On the basis of a
counterfactual demand prediction the authors conclude that the terror attacks and security
measures account for roughly 94% of the decline in RPMs from the historical peak.
Estimated impacts of terrorism on tourism vary considerably, because the structure of the
tourism industry and terror campaigns differ, not only across countries, but also over time.
This hampers comparisons between studies. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of
differentiating between different types of attacks, e.g. the location of an attack (i.e. whether it
takes place in an urban or a rural area) and the number of casualties (see e.g. Drakos and
Kutan, 2003).
Some scholars argue that terrorism could also be a reaction to irresponsible tourism
development (e.g. Aziz, 1995, p. 93, for Egypt). In the aforementioned study for Spain by
Enders and Sandler (1991), the argument is empirically assessed. It is found that causality is
unidirectional, i.e. terrorism affects the inflow of tourists, but not the reverse.
The figures presented so far measure how the tourism industry in a particular country (or
region) is affected by terrorist attacks taking place in that country (or region). However, two
interdependencies between different countries’ tourism industries and their terrorist
campaigns are possible. On the one hand, the deterrent effect of terrorism on tourists in a
particular country may benefit the tourism industries in alternative destinations. On the other
hand, tourists may fear that terrorism could spill over into countries previously not involved
and, therefore, abstain from visiting neighbouring countries. Though the substitution effect
and the contagion effect (or negative externality) are countervailing, they can be
simultaneously present. The regional interdependencies are explicitly modeled in the analysis
of Drakos and Kutan (2003). Using monthly data for the period 1991 to 2000 and employing
the SURE method, they investigate the effect of terrorism in Greece, Israel and Turkey on
each other’s market share, with Italy serving as a control country, representing the rest of the
Mediterranean region. Their findings indicate that there are significant substitution effects.
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But there is also empirical evidence for the contagion effect: only around 11% of aggregate
loss in market shares is directed toward other destinations within the group of countries under
consideration, whereas around 89% flows out of the region. Enders, Sandler and Parise
(1992) study the effects of terrorism for a series of European countries. They estimate the
aggregate losses in revenue for Austria, Greece and Italy to amount to $ 4.467 billion.
Although they find no significant effect of terrorism in other continental European countries
on the tourism revenues, the loss of tourism revenues due to terrorism for continental Europe
as a whole is estimated to be $16.145 billion. Therefore, continental Europe as a whole is
much more negatively affected by terrorism than the sum of the country-by-country effects
would imply. This result is again evidence for a contagion effect or negative externalities. The
contagion and substitution effects have been empirically established for the tourism industry.
However, these interdependencies are likely to be of general importance.
A note of caution is in order with regard to the temporal patterns of the impact of terrorism on
tourism.7 The temporal pattern depends on the type of attacks in a particular country, and the
market structure as well as the type of time-series used by researchers. Time-series on the
number of actual visits are likely to respond more quickly to a terrorist incident than time-
series on tourism revenues, due to long-term contracts between tourist destinations and tour
operators. Nevertheless, surprisingly different time spans are estimated until tourism begins to
respond to a terrorist incident after it has elapsed. While Enders and Sandler (1991) and
Fleischer and Buccola (2002) find relatively immediate effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e.
after two to three months, for Spain and Israel respectively, Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992)
find tourism to be unaffected by a terrorist incident until a full 18 to 21 months afterwards in
the case of continental Europe and Austria respectively.
To summarize, terrorism systematically influences tourists’ choice of destination and can,
therefore, substantially negatively affect a host country. Moreover, the effect is long-lasting
and has an impact on the demand for tourism in neighbouring countries. It remains an open
question whether tourists’ reactions to the threat of terrorism are rational. According to a
RAND survey conducted in 1989, a third of those Americans interviewed said they would
refuse the opportunity to travel abroad because of the risk of terrorism (Downes-Le Guin and
Hoffman, 1993). It is hard to think of similar precautionary measures against life-threatening
eventualities taking place with the same likelihood. More generally, Viscusi and Zeckhauser
                                                 
7 This is particularly important as, in studies based on time-series methods, the monthly or quarterly
impacts are aggregated to assess the total impact of a terrorist incident. Hence, the plausibility of the
temporal pattern needs careful attention.
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(2003) find that people are subject to a propensity to predict worst-case scenarios in assessing
terrorism risks and are prone to anomalies known from other risk perception contexts.
Similarly, Sunstein (2003) shows that individuals focus on the badness of the outcome rather
than on the probability that it will occur. The “probability neglect” results in fear that greatly
exceeds discounted harm.
2. Foreign direct investment (FDI). Terrorism affects the allocation decision of firms
investing money in real foreign assets. Terrorists can quite easily attack and damage foreign
owned firms, seriously disrupting their activities. As the foreigners have a large choice of
countries to invest in, even quite mild terrorist activities tend to considerably reduce the
inflow of capital to a terror-stricken country (see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2005, for a formal
exposition of this argument).
This has been well documented in the case of Spain and Greece, again using VAR
methodology and quarterly terrorism data (Enders and Sandler, 1996).8 In Spain, terrorism is
estimated to have reduced annual FDI inflow by 13.5% on average for the period 1975-1991.
This translates into a decline in real FDI of almost 500 million dollars. In a similar period of
time (1976-1991), Greece was plagued by two major terrorist organizations, the 17 November
and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle. Both are extreme left-wing movements. The
reduction of FDI was estimated to be, on average, 11.9% annually. This translates into a loss
amounting to almost 400 million dollars. These results are corroborated by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2005) in a cross-section analysis for a sample of 110 countries. Using a measure
of terrorism risk constructed by an international risk agency, they find a large negative effect
on countries’ net stock of FDI that is statistically significant and robust to various
specifications. A one standard deviation change in terrorism risk, which is about an increase
in terrorism risk from the level of Italy to the level of the US, induces a fall in the net position
of about 5% of GDP. The inclusion of various political, economic, legal, tax, operational and
security factors in the empirical framework suggests that terrorism, and more generally,
security are among the most apparent and robust country-specific determinants of net FDI. As
FDI is an important source of savings, a reduction in FDI negatively affects investment and
economic growth. Moreover, the transfer of technological know-how into the country is
reduced, again putting a damper on growth. Thus, the economic costs are substantial.
                                                 
8 For three larger European nations, namely France, West Germany and Italy, Enders and Sandler
(1996) find no impact of terrorism on FDI.
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3. Savings and consumption. Apart from foreign direct investment, the investment rate is
mainly constrained by the domestic savings rate. Consumption and, hence, savings rates may
be affected by terrorist activity in different ways. On the one hand, political violence might
increase perceived risks associated with savings, either because legal claims on assets are
compromised or because individuals are prevented from spending the money their savings
have earned. On the other hand, terrorism may induce individuals to place their money in safe
havens rather than buy, for example, durable consumer goods. The two effects point in
opposite directions; how consumption is affected by terrorism is, therefore, ultimately an
empirical question. However, the empirical evidence is also ambiguous. Fielding (2003a) uses
the variation in political tensions and violence in Israel over time to analyze the impact of
political instability on Israeli aggregate consumption and thus on aggregate savings. He
hypothesizes that the perceived insecurity depends mainly on the number of deaths in Israel
proper and/or the number of deaths in the West Bank and Gaza areas, as well as the rate of
growth of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas. To investigate the impact
of political instability on Israeli savings, Fielding (2003a) estimates a macro-econometric
consumption function for Israel in the period 1989-1999 with quarterly data including the
indicators of political instability mentioned. This permits the computation of how aggregate
private sector consumption would change if there were to be a complete cessation of the
conflict (measured by these indicators). If the number of fatalities in Israel proper decreased
by its average level, consumption would fall by over 7%. The respective number for a
reduction of fatalities in the West Bank and Gaza areas is over 5%. In contrast, the effect of
freezing settlement construction would be negligibly small. Given Israel’s poor savings
performance, the effect would be huge. According to Fielding (2003a, p. 309), “the savings
ratio in Israel would almost double as a result of a complete cessation of violence.” Eckstein
and Tsiddon (2004), in contrast, using VAR methodology estimates with quarterly data for
the Israeli economy from 1950-2003, find a negative effect of terrorism on consumption.
They expect that the continued terror (of a size similar to the number of deaths due to car
accidents) will decrease annual consumption per capita by about 5% in 2004.9
4. Investment. The effect of terrorism on aggregate consumption and savings is important as it
influences the investment level and, hence, economic growth. In addition, one can
                                                 
9 In an alternative approach, lower consumption growth and higher volatility in consumption due to
terrorist attacks could be directly translated in a fraction of the level of initial consumption that
households would be willing to give up in order to obtain a peaceful path. Hess (2003) provides an
empirical application for a wide range of military conflicts.
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hypothesize that political violence not only affects the level of investments but also the
composition of investments (Collier, 1999). Investments in non-traded capital goods, or non-
residential construction, are particularly risky in an environment of political instability. Such
investments may, therefore, be reduced more than investments in machinery and equipment if
political violence increases. Using a macro-econometric quarterly time-series model of
investment in Israel for the period 1988-1998, conditioned on indicators of political
instability, Fielding (2003b) investigates the impact of political instability on the level and
composition of investments. To analyze the impact on the composition of investments, two
investment equations, one for non-traded capital goods and one for machinery and equipment,
are estimated. As an increase in investment in one category has a positive effect on
investments in the other category, the dynamic effect between these two categories is
important in calculating the total effect. The indicators of political instability are the number
of Jews killed, the number of Palestinians killed and the rate of growth of the Jewish
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas. Fielding (2003b) finds both the number of
Israelis killed and the rate of growth of Jewish settlements to have a significantly negative
impact on investment in non-residential construction. Manufacturing and equipment
investment is significantly lowered by an increase in the total number of deaths and the rate of
growth of settlements.10 Again, a “peace dividend”, or the implicit increase in investment
from a complete cessation of the conflict, can be estimated. Were the number of deaths to
drop to zero, construction investment would be 27.9% higher and machinery and equipment
investment would be 14.6% higher in the steady state. The different magnitude of these two
effects confirms that investment composition is affected by political violence. In comparison
to the impact of fatalities, the likely impact of a cessation of the expansion of settlements
would again be small: the respective figures are 2.77% and 1.10%. Overall, these effects are
huge and would be even larger if second order effects were taken into consideration. For
example, a stabilization of the political situation is likely to accelerate economic growth and,
therefore, raise investment demand even further.
6. Stock markets. In the aftermath of spectacular attacks, the impact on financial markets is
usually widely discussed in the media. Stock prices are a potentially informative measure of
the economic damage of terrorism. Stock prices reflect expected future gains of a company,
as well as the likelihood that these expected gains materialize. Terrorist attacks influence
                                                 
10 Why the different investment decisions are influenced by different fatality series remains a puzzle
(Fielding, 2003b, p. 175).
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both: (i) Expected profits are lower if security measures increase the costs of production and
doing business, and if consumers’ fear reduces demand, like in the airline industry. (ii) The
risk premium is higher when terrorism leads to increased uncertainty about a firm’s prospects
on the market.11 Empirically, the difficulty is in disentangling investors’ decentralized
evaluation of a firm’s costs from terrorism, as reflected in the stock price, from a host of other
factors. When looking for a contra factual market capitalization, one has, for example, to take
into consideration that stock prices already reflect expected terrorist attacks before any event
actually occurs. Previous research, therefore, has concentrated on single unexpected events or
intensifications of terrorist activities.
An event which has been carefully analyzed is the cease-fire the Basque ETA declared
between 1998 and 1999 (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). This can be taken to be a natural
experiment to estimate the cost of the terrorist conflict in terms of its effect on the stock value
of a sample of Basque and non-Basque firms. If the terrorist conflict was perceived to have a
negative effect on the Basque economy, stocks of firms with a significant part of their
business activity in the Basque country should exhibit a positive relative performance when
the truce began, and a negative relative performance when the truce ended. Basque stocks did
indeed outperform non-Basque stocks as the truce became credible. The compounded
abnormal returns for the 22 trading sessions of the good news period were 10.14% for the
Basque portfolio relative to the non-Basque portfolio. At the end of the cease-fire, Basque
stocks showed a negative performance relative to non-Basque stocks (with a relative loss over
66 trading sessions of 11.21%).
In a broad event study for 14 terrorist/military attacks, returns on the US capital market are
analyzed (Chen and Siems, 2004). Empirically, deviations of the Dow Jones Industrial stock
index returns from past average returns (30 to 11 trading days before the event) are studied
for different time frames. Military attacks in the past, like the invasion of France (May 12,
1940), or the one in North Korea (June 25, 1950), led to substantial negative cumulative
abnormal returns when measured over 11 trading days. In contrast, there are no abnormal
returns even on the actual day of the event of terrorist bombing attacks on Pan Am
(December 21, 1988), the World Trade Center (February 26, 1993), Oklahoma City (April 19,
                                                 
11 The effect of terrorism on the systematic risk (beta) is studied for the events of September 11. In a
sample of US firms from various sectors, models with time-varying betas find very heterogeneous
effects of the event (Choudhry, 2005). For the airline industry around the world, however, there is a
clear structural break. Conditional systematic risk, on average, doubled following September 11, 2001,
whereby US airlines were most affected (Drakos, 2004).
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1995) or the US Embassy in Kenya (August 7, 1998). The single recent terrorist event, that
even after six trading days showed statistically significantly negative cumulative abnormal
returns, was September 11, 2001.
It is, however, difficult to relate the size and duration of abnormal returns to fundamental
economic costs. Stock market fluctuations are likely to be larger than the underlying changes
in fundamental values, because investors also buy and sell based on expectations about
others’ behaviour (Shiller, 2003). This may explain why, after months of experience with the
Israeli Palestinian conflict, the stock market in Israel still reacts with a similar magnitude to
suicide bombings (Eldor and Melnick, 2004), although one might think that underlying
fundamental expectations do not systematically change with each new incident. Overall, the
Israeli Palestinian conflict reduced the stock market capitalization substantially. Whilst up
until the intensification of the conflict on September 27, 2000, S&P 500 and the Israeli stock
market developed in a very similar way, after this date the latter’s performance dropped
considerably. Compared to a simulation without terrorism, the index was 30% lower in June
30, 2003 (Eldor and Melnick, 2004).
Some multiplier of terrorist attacks on firm values lies in the capital market itself. As far as
events affect the technological functioning of capital markets, for example, by interrupted
interbank payments, liquidity shortages can lead to reduced system stability, even with the
danger of consumer panic. Recent experience with the mature US banking system, however,
shows that an adequate provision of liquidity by the central bank can prevent such potential
damage. After September 11, 2001, the Federal Reserve at one point injected more than $ 100
billion in additional liquidity (Lacker, 2004).
7. Foreign trade. Terrorist activities can affect foreign trade in several ways. First, the costs
of doing business are raised by a general increase in insecurity as a result of terrorism.
Second, augmented security measures in response to a terrorist campaign increase transaction
costs. Third, there is the risk of a direct destruction of traded goods. The repeated attacks on
oil pipelines in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, which temporarily paralyzed oil exports,
are a recent example of the latter risk. Another example is the attack launched on the French
supertanker “Limburg” off Yemen’s coast in October 2002. In many countries one of the
largest export industries is the tourism industry. As already discussed, this industry is directly
affected by terrorism.
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Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) use an extended gravity model, containing the conventional
determinants and, in addition, the annual number of international terrorist attacks in a country
to assess the impact of terrorism on trade between more than 200 countries for the period
1968 to 1979. According to their results, countries targeted by terrorism trade significantly
less with each other than countries not affected by terrorism. Moreover, the effect is
economically large: a doubling of the number of terrorist incidents reduces the bilateral trade
flows by 4%.
8. Urban economy. Terrorism may influence the relative advantage of living in a city
compared to living in the countryside, and may thus affect urbanization: cities can exploit the
positive economies of scale of defending their population. At the same time, the high
population density makes cities an attractive target for terrorists. Finally, violence and
terrorism raise transport costs. Transport costs can be substituted by closer physical vicinity.
The last two influences are most relevant for modern terrorism, but they point in opposite
directions. An analysis of the population development in London, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv
indicates that terrorism has had little if any impact. Despite the relative safety of Tel Aviv, its
population growth over the past 50 years actually lags behind that of Jerusalem (Glaeser and
Shapiro, 2002). Similarly, cross-country evidence suggests that the overall impact of
terrorism on urbanization is likely to be small. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) regress a dummy
variable that indicates whether a country experienced terrorism in the period 1968 to 1977
and, alternatively, the log number of terrorist incidents in this period on the extent of
urbanization in 1978 and the number of skyscrapers built. While there is a positive
relationship between terrorism and the extent of urbanization, Glaeser and Shapiro (2002)
assert that “this link is small, statistically weak, and causally dubious” (p. 223). No evidence
is found for an effect of terrorism on the number of tall buildings built in a country.12
Various studies have estimated the economic effects of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001. The direct costs consist of the destruction of infrastructure and human capital. The
collapse of the twin towers destroyed 13 million square feet of real estate, and 30% of
superior office space in downtown New York. But this accounts for only 4% of the total
office space situated in Manhattan. One estimate of the real and human capital costs ranges
from 25 to 60 billion dollars (Becker and Murphy, 2001). Another study estimates the human
capital loss to be 40 billion dollars, and the property loss to be between 10 and 13 billion
                                                 
12 Other studies that discuss the impact of terrorism on urban development are Bram, Haughwout and
Orr (2002), Harrigan and Martin (2002), Mills (2002) and Wildasin (2002).
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dollars (Navarro and Spencer, 2001). Yet another estimate of the total direct loss is 21.4
billion dollars (International Monetary Fund, 2001). Looking at the extent of destruction
relative to the overall US productive capacity indicates that the damage was minor (Brauer,
2002). The estimates of between 10 and 60 billion dollars worth of damage resulting from the
attacks of September 11, 2001 is relatively small compared to the American GNP of 10
trillion dollars.
However, the indirect costs may be substantial. They consist of the induced cost of doing
business, for instance longer waitings at airports, higher friction and transactions costs in
international trade, as well as the cost of the military and civilian resources used to fight
terrorism. To achieve a significant reduction in the probability of falling prey to a terrorist
attack is certainly expensive. The fraction of the economic potential that can be used for
consumption today and in the future is significantly reduced. But it is impossible to attach any
serious figure to these factors. This is particularly so if the effects outside the United States
are also taken into account. Based on a computable general equilibrium model (Walkenhorst
and Dihel, 2002), it has been estimated that the indirect cost of increased economic friction in
international trade is larger for other regions of the world than for North America.
9. National income and growth. Estimating the overall effect of terrorism on the economy13 is
faced with the problem of how the economy would have developed if there had been less
terrorism, or no terrorism at all. To construct a counterfactual is not easy. An interesting
attempt has been made for the Basque country, with a “synthetic” control region made up of
other Spanish regions, but in many ways resembling the relevant economic characteristics of
the Basque country before the onset of political terrorism by the ETA in the 1970s (Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003). The subsequent economic development of this counterfactual
synthetic region is compared to the actual experience of the Basque country. It is estimated
that, after the outbreak of terrorism, the per capita GDP in the Basque country fell by about 10
                                                 
13 The effect of general political instability (or stable political institutions, alternatively) on the growth
of national income has been analyzed using cross section data by Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996)
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) among others. The latter studies also address the
problem of reverse causality: as argued by Olson (1982), political instability may not only be a cause
but also an effect of economic fluctuations. The same might be true in the case of terrorism. A notable
study analyzing the effect of income and education on terrorism is a paper by Krueger and Maleckova
(2003). On the basis of a variety of evidence, such as the influence of living standards on the support
for violent attacks by Palestinians on Israelis expressed in opinion polls and a comparison of the
characteristics of the Hezbollah activists killed with those of the general Lebanese population, the
authors conclude that terrorism is not a response to bad economic conditions: “[T]he evidence we have
assembled does not indicate a connection between poverty and terrorism, and we are not aware of
compelling evidence that points in the opposite direction” (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p. 121).
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percentage points relative to the control region. This gap tends to widen when terrorist
activities are on the increase. If the terrorist activities by the ETA had a negative economic
effect on other Spanish regions (included in the synthetic control), the GNP gap estimated for
the Basque country is a lower bound. In contrast, if the terrorist activities diverted investment
from the Basque country to other Spanish regions, the magnitude of the gap is artificially
increased. However, the authors convincingly argue that the two biases are likely to be small.
An extensive VAR study of the macroeconomic effects of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess and
Orphanides, 2004; see also Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004) uses a panel set with
annual observations for 177 countries from 1968 to 2000. It controls for the interactions
between terrorism and other forms of internal and external conflict and is therefore able to
differentiate between similar types of political disruptions. On average, terrorism (captured by
the ITERATE data) is found to depress economic growth in a marked, and statistically
significant, way. However, this effect is considerably smaller and less persistent than that
exerted by external wars and internal conflicts. Spending is diverted from investment to
public expenditures. Interestingly enough, the negative association between terrorism and
economic growth is small and statistically insignificant for advanced (OECD) economies,
which are most affected by terrorism. The depressing effect of terrorism on economic growth
appears to be most significant for developing countries. Overall, the relationship between
terrorism and economic growth can mainly be attributed to country fixed effects.
Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) focus on one dimension of terrorism, the insecurity which
manifests in daily life. Increasing terror makes life less certain and shorter.14 Using a closed-
economy-infinite-horizon model, the government in charge of public security as a public good
reduces the death toll by stepping up defence expenditures when terrorism increases. If it acts
optimally, it does not fully offset the tide. A long-run equilibrium with an optimizing
government is characterized by lower output, going with a higher intensity of terror. An
econometric test for Israel, based on data from 1950 to 2003, indeed reveals an increase in the
ratio of defence expenditures to GNP from 9% to 12% in the period of the Intifada (2000-
2003:3) and a drastic reduction in output per capita. Over this period, output per capita
declined annually by 3%. If terrorism remains as high as it was in 2003, per capita GDP will
be about 3.5% lower by 2004:3 than if terrorism stops.
                                                 
14 Other dimensions could be the effect of terror on the deterioration of health (thereby lowering
productivity) and on human capital (Tsiddon, 1995).
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These effects of terrorist actions on the various sectors and the overall economy do not
capture the total costs of terrorism. Non-market values are, by definition, excluded from these
measures. The fear of individuals and the grief of the victims and the bereaved are
disregarded. It follows that the damage perpetrated by terrorism may be considerably
underestimated. If policy makers take the estimates discussed above seriously, they would
allocate too little money to dealing with terrorism and rather use the funds and their energy
for pursuing other goals. In the following section, therefore, methods are discussed for
capturing total utility losses people suffer as a result of terrorist activities.
4. Utility consequences of terrorism
The disutility from the public bad, terrorism, like the benefits from public goods, is inherently
difficult to measure. However, a wide variety of different approaches for the measurement of
preferences has been developed (see, e.g., Freeman, 2003), in particular to value
environmental quality and the cultural heritage. These approaches can potentially be applied
to value the threat of terrorism as well. We briefly discuss existing techniques emphasizing
possible advantages and likely drawbacks in the study of terrorism. The focus is on a new,
and we think, promising approach: the life satisfaction approach.
4.1 Traditional methods
Two avenues have been pursued to infer and elicit individuals’ preferences for public goods
and externalities: stated preference methods on the one hand and revealed preference methods
on the other hand. The most prominent exponent of the former is the contingent valuation
method and of the latter the hedonic market approach.
1. Contingent valuation surveys enable researchers to assess the effect of a reduction of
terrorism on utility, including non-use values.15 Terrorism is directly assessed, using survey
questions on people’s willingness to pay, for example, for a bisection of the number of
terrorist incidents in a region. While this is an appealingly easy framework, there are a
number of difficulties with this approach. The survey respondents find themselves in an
unfamiliar situation and may be induced to give strategic responses. Important design issues
to address these problems are the presentation of adequate information, a credible
                                                 
15 See Carson et al. (2003) for an elaborate and state-of-the-art contingent valuation study in the
environmental realm. The credibility and validity of the results based on the contingent valuation
method are the subject of a heated controversy in economic literature, as a symposium in the Journal
of Economic Perspectives (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hanemann, 1994; Portney, 1994)
demonstrates.
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(hypothetical) payment mechanism and the use of the incentive-compatible referendum
format (Portney, 1994). In order to avoid symbolic valuation, a survey must also contain a
detailed description of a hypothetical policy program, which the respondents believe to be
capable of providing the public good in question, i.e. the reduction in terrorist incidents. In
light of the failure of most traditional anti-terrorism policies, this is likely to be a difficult
task.
A basic problem of applying contingent valuation to terrorism is that it is not obvious what
preferences should enter. Two aspects are of particular importance. First, psychological
anomalies play a major role. A vital aspect is that the disparity between gains and losses
matters. It is therefore important whether one asks what people would be prepared to pay in
order to reduce terrorism, or what they would be prepared to accept in order to tolerate some
degree of terrorism. Second, terrorism is an international phenomenon and terrorists often
have no difficulty in moving from one country to another. For this reason, the anti-terrorism
policies of a particular country produce international or even global externalities. An anti-
terrorism policy that successfully prevents terrorists from attacking a particular country
increases the probability of attacks in other countries (Lee, 1988; Sandler and Lapan, 1988).
On the other hand, anti-terrorism policies, based on positive incentives (Frey and Luechinger,
2003; 2004), entail positive externalities for other countries. The dimension of the relevant
population, whose values for security from a specific terrorist campaign should be sought, is a
question of values. Another problem with a contingent valuation survey is that individuals
evaluate specific objects or specific victims quite differently from a non-specified, or
statistical, victim (Schelling, 1968; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). People are prepared to
spend much less on efforts to save as yet unidentified lives than identified lives from terrorist
attacks.
Contingent valuation surveys may nevertheless provide valuable insights into the utility losses
imposed by terrorism. So far there is only one survey study that examines the trade-off
between money and terrorism risk (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2003). The main research interest
of this study, however, is whether the answers reflect a rational response to terrorism risks.
The subjects were asked what increase in the price of a plane ticket they would be willing to
pay if the risk of a terrorist attack on an airplane were to be reduced (a) by 50%, (b) to one in
a million per flight, (c) to one in 10 million per flight or finally (d) to zero. The average
increase in price subjects are willing to pay for a plane ticket is (a) ca. 25%, (b) ca. 38%, (c)
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ca. 53% and (d) ca. 70% respectively. These estimates reflect a well-known premium for
reaching a zero risk level (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 for the “certainty effect”).
2. The hedonic market approach is based on the idea that markets, primarily the housing and
the labour markets, reflect the utility losses imposed on individuals by terrorist activity.16
Higher wages must be paid to compensate employees for the disamenities incurred by
working in a region ridden with terrorism. Similarly, the rent for housing and land to be paid
is negatively affected by terrorism. In equilibrium, the marginal implicit compensations
associated with working or living in a region plagued by terrorism equals the corresponding
marginal willingness to accept. To our knowledge, no study employs the hedonic market
approach in particular, or revealed preference methods in general, to evaluate the
consequences of terrorism.
A major drawback of the hedonic market approach is that it is based on the assumption that
the market is perfect and in equilibrium, and fully reflects changes in the amount and intensity
of terrorism. The adjustment that people are likely to make in response to changes in the
intensity of a terrorist campaign, as well as changes in the supply side of the hedonic property
market, needs to be accounted for (Freeman, 2003, pp. 373 and 381). Similarly, it might be
difficult to isolate the effects of terrorism from those caused by government reactions.
Indirect estimations of utility losses can only be applied if the individuals are aware of
changes in the terrorism risk over time and/or differences across regions. Individuals’
difficulties in assessing terrorism risk may, therefore, hamper the application of revealed
preference methods (see e.g. Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman, 1993; Sunstein, 2003; Viscusi
and Zeckhauser, 2003). This also implies that unanticipated and cataclysmic terrorist acts
cannot be evaluated. Further, revealed preferences may reflect anticipated future risk rather
than current risk. Finally, revealed preference methods cannot capture non-use values.
4.2 Effects on life satisfaction
People’s assessment of their overall well-being can be directly captured by measures of
reported subjective well-being. In large representative questionnaire studies, individuals are
asked about their level of life satisfaction or happiness. This opens new possibilities for
                                                 
16 Exemplary contributions are Blomquist; Berger and Hoehn (1988) and Chay and Greenstone (2004).
Another revealed preference method that potentially allows for the assessment of utility losses due to
terrorism is the defense expenditure approach or averting behavior method. The basic idea of this
method is that individuals’ evaluation for a change in the provision of a public good is reflected in
accompanying changes in expenditures for substitutive private goods (see e.g. Zeckhauser and Fisher,
1976).
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studying important economic questions (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002a,b, for surveys). For
example, with reported subjective well-being as a proxy measure for utility, it is now a
straightforward strategy to directly evaluate public goods, or a public bad like terrorism, in
utility terms. By measuring the marginal utility of a public good or the marginal disutility of a
public bad, as well as the marginal utility of income, the marginal rate of substitution between
income and the public good can be calculated. This allows for the computation of relevant
welfare measures for marginal and infra-marginal changes in the public good provision. We
call this the life satisfaction approach.17
It stands to reason that people living in a country rife with terrorism are less happy than those
living under more orderly political conditions. An example is the Dominican Republic in
1962 where, after president Trujillo’s murder, the political situation was very unsettled and
political chaos was a real threat. The level of life satisfaction recorded in that country was the
lowest ever recorded, namely 1.6 on a 0 to 10 scale. In contrast, in politically stable
democracies, such as Switzerland, Norway or Denmark, the population expresses high levels
of life satisfaction. The corresponding values were, for example, in the 1990s 8.16 for
Denmark, 8.02 for Switzerland and 7.66 for Norway. Thus, happiness and political stability
seem to be closely related.
The life satisfaction approach has several important advantages over the approaches discussed
so far in measuring people’s utility losses due to terrorist activity. Contrary to contingent
valuation surveys, this approach does not rely on asking people how they value a public good
or an anti-terrorism policy. The hypothetical nature of these questions and the unfamiliar
situation for the respondents are the principal reasons for most of the scepticism about, and
problems concerning, the contingent valuation method. It is a demanding cognitive task, and
superficial or socially desirable responses, without adequate consideration of the budget
constraint or substitutes, can result. To correctly state one’s own current level of life
satisfaction, in contrast, is much less demanding and strategic responses are unlikely.
Similarly, the stringent conditions of the approaches based on revealed preferences, like
housing or labour market equilibrium in the case of the hedonic market approach, do not have
to be met in order to evaluate welfare effects through the use of life satisfaction data.18
                                                 
17 See Welsch (2002) and van Praag and Baarsma (2005) for the evaluation of externalities in the
environmental realm with reported subjective well-being data.
18 However, there are the conditions of cardinality and interpersonal comparability of the individual
statements of well-being. Although economists are likely to be skeptical about both claims, there is a
lot of evidence that both of them may be less of a problem on a practical level than on a theoretical
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Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) use the life satisfaction approach to assess the costs of
terrorism in France, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. By way of illustration,
an analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict is presented here.
Life satisfaction data are taken from the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1970-1999); the
variable is the categorical response to the following question: “On the whole, are you very
satisfied [4], fairly satisfied [3], not very satisfied [2], or not at all satisfied [1] with the life
you lead?” As an indicator for the salience and intensity of terrorist activity, the number of
deaths resulting from the conflict in Northern Ireland is taken, as compiled by Sutton (1994;
an updated index is provided by the Conflict Archive on the Internet (www.cain.ulst.ac.uk)).
This indicator is not restricted to terrorism in particular, but includes political violence in
general. In order to identify the effect of terrorism on individuals’ life satisfaction, the authors
use a combined time-series (for the period 1975 to 1998) and cross-section analysis (with
Northern Ireland, the rest of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland). Specifically, a
micro-econometric happiness function is specified, whereby the life satisfaction of an
individual living in a particular region at a particular time is explained by differences in the
level of terrorism across the three regions and over time, the individual’s household income,
other personal and socio-demographic characteristics, as well as region and time fixed effects.
The estimation results suggest that the number of terrorist fatalities has a statistically
significant negative effect on reported life satisfaction. For an increase of one standard
deviation in the number of recorded fatalities, i.e. an increase of 53.7 fatalities, life
satisfaction is lowered by 0.041 on the four-point scale. This effect is about a tenth of the
effect of being unemployed rather than employed. Thus, the indicator for terrorism is
correlated with people’s subjective well-being in a sizeable way.
The estimated coefficients for terrorism and individual income can be used to calculate the
hypothetical willingness-to-pay for a discrete change in the level of terrorism. Frey,
Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) calculate a hypothetical willingness-to-pay of a resident of
Northern Ireland for a reduction in the number of fatalities to the average level of Great
Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Accordingly, a resident of Northern Ireland (with average
household income) would be willing to pay around 41% of his income for a reduction in
                                                                                                                                                         
level (see e.g. Kahneman, 1999; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Furthermore, the life
satisfaction approach has several problems in common with the revealed preference methods: (i) It is
not immune to spurious correlations that are the result of omitted variables, (ii) perceived risks must
be correlated with objective risk measures and (iii) pure public goods and, therefore, the existence
value cannot be captured.
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terrorist activity to the level that prevails in the more peaceful parts of the country or the sister
republic. This estimate is surprisingly high. However, it might to some extent reflect the
ferocity of the conflict. After all, Northern Ireland was on the brink of all-out civil war; Fay,
Morrissey and Smyth (1999, p. 204), for example, estimate that around two thirds of the
Northern Irish population live in households where someone has been injured in a conflict
related incident.
This result indicates that utility losses may far exceed the economic consequences discussed
in section 3.
5. Concluding remarks
A lot of the research on terrorism, even by economists, is based on the number of terrorist
incidents and casualties. As our survey shows, it is possible to go much further. A sizeable
literature already exists on the economic consequences of terrorism, such as on tourism,
foreign direct investment, savings and consumption, investment, stock prices, foreign trade
and the urban economy as well as national income and growth. But studies so far have
neglected to analyze the utility losses induced by terrorism, which we suggest are
considerably larger than the purely economic losses. The standard method of measuring the
benefits (or costs) of public goods (or bads) is to employ stated preference methods (in
particular, contingent valuation surveys) and revealed preference methods (for example, by
looking at hedonic markets). However, these approaches face considerable problems,
especially when an attempt is made to estimate the utility losses resulting from terrorism, and
so have not yet been used for that purpose.
We propose a new approach based on life satisfaction or subjective well-being data, which are
collected independently of the data on terrorist activities, and are therefore not biased by any
immediate priming effects. The estimates presented reveal that terrorism leads a considerable
reduction in life satisfaction, suggesting that individuals incur large utility losses. Individuals
would need to receive substantial increases in income in order to compensate for the harm
inflicted by terrorism. The results reported here refer only to the Northern Ireland conflict. It
would certainly be necessary to apply this approach to different countries, different periods of
history and different types of terrorism. Future research needs to undertake systematic
comparisons between the standard methods of measuring the benefits of public goods and the
life satisfaction approach. It should be taken into account that the measures of life satisfaction
applied here could be improved upon. The life satisfaction approach should therefore not be
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criticized solely on the basis of the existing quality of subjective well-being measures. Rather,
scholars need to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful relationship can be established,
and econometrically estimated, between life satisfaction data and terrorist acts.
Future research should also endeavour to distinguish between the direct and indirect
consequences of a terrorist incident. The indirect consequences include the costs imposed on
the population of the targeted country by the political reactions. As discussed above,
numerous reported estimates reflect the direct consequences of terrorism as well as the impact
of the subsequent counter measures. In the case of foreign trade and the aviation industry, for
example, enhanced security measures are likely to account to a considerable extent for the
reduction in bilateral trade and the drop in demand. Political reactions may reflect voters’
demands for increased security or politicians’ strategic exploitation of the “rally round the
flag” effect, and may range from increased expenditures for military and secret services to
restrictions on human rights. More extensive studies would not only require data on the
number and severity of terrorist attacks, but would also need to analyze the determinants of
political actions imposing these indirect costs on the population.
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